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JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
78-2a-3(2)(j).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A-1 Disposal agrees that the issue is whether or not the Court erred
when it ruled that there was no valid contract between the parties and
agrees that the standard of review for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous
standard. However, A-1 Disposal does not agree that both parties testified
that there was a contract and does not agree that that issue was not in
contention and was not disputed by the parties.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9):
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions
and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented,
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to
recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(c)(1):
Rule 54. Judgments; costs;
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is
entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not
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demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or
more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires
it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or
among themselves.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

The case involves a claim by A-1 Disposal for money due for waste
disposal services provided to Mel Ingersoll. Mr. Ingersoll counterclaimed,
alleging that A-1 owed him money for a credit allegedly due him, pursuant to
a hand written agreement.
A-l claimed that any agreement that Mr. Ingersoll was due a credit was
void because Mr. Ingersoll and Mark Powell, who was not named and who
was to perform certain obligations not identified in the written document,
had failed to perform the obligations that would have resulted in the credit
being due. Mr. Ingersoll claimed that despite the fact that Mr. Powell was
not made a party to the written document and the obligations to be
performed by Powell were not identified, Mr. Ingersoll was still entitled to the
credit.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.
A-l filed suit against Mr. Ingersoll, claiming money due for the services
rendered. Mr. Ingersoll filed a counterclaim, claiming that there was a
balance due to him because of the credit he claimed under a hand written
document signed by Mr. Anderson in May 2002. The case was tried before
the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck on April 27, 2005 without a jury and A-l
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was awarded judgment in the amount of $8,307.00, plus interest on that
amount from September 10, 2002. Recovery on Mr. Ingersoll's counterclaim
was denied.
Mr. IngersoU filed a Motion for New Trial or to Alter or Amend Judgment
on May 14, 2005. That Motion was denied by Minute Entry dated February
8, 2006. Mr. IngersoU now appeals from the denial of that Motion and the
judgment of the Court.
C. Statement of Facts.
On May 15, 2002, Ralph Anderson, manager of Appellee A-l Disposal,
met Appellant Mel IngersoU and a third party, Mark Powell, at a fast food
restaurant in Salt Lake City, to discuss a business proposition that would
involve A-l Disposal, Mr. IngersoU and Mr. Powell. A-l had previously
provided trash disposal services to Mr. Powell and there was an outstanding
debt due to A-1 from Mr. Powell. Mr. Anderson had never met Mr. IngersoU
and A-l Disposal had never done business with Mr. IngersoU before the
meeting. R. at 88, pp. 17-19. After some discussion, Mr. IngersoU wrote out
a document on scratch paper that was signed by Mr. Anderson and Mr.
IngersoU, but not by Mr. Powell. The document provided,
Wherein A-1 acknowledges a credit owing Mel IngersoU in the amount of
$14,500, to be paid in the following manner: A-l will furnish 30 yard
(drop off) containers for IngersoU for a cost of $75.00 each with A-l
paying landfill cost over that. Thereby if trucking & landfill total
$10,000 for a month, IngersoU will pay $2500 and use the $7500 credit
on the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the payment 25%
of total bill to be paid by 10 th of month following. Service can continue
after credit is used up if its agreeable with both parties. R. at 88, p.20;
R. at 44.
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There were also oral discussions between the parties at this meeting
regarding the proposed transaction, as Mr. Powell was to deliver a truck and
three containers to A-1 and Mr. Ingersoll was to deliver a truck to Mr. Powell,
but there were apparently no terms agreed to as to when, where and how the
performances of each party was to be completed. R. at 88, pp. 19-20. A-l
immediately began providing service to Mr. Ingersoll, and continued the
service through August 2002. R. at 88, pp. 21-22. Invoices for the services
were sent by A-1 to Mr. Ingersoll weekly, but Mr. Ingersoll failed to pay for
the services provided. R. at 88, p. 2 1 . A-l did receive a truck and two
containers from Mr. Powell, but the truck was not in working condition and
repair parts were not available, so the truck was never operable. The third
container was never delivered to A-l by Mr. Powell. R. at 88, pp. 53-54. Mr.
Powell advised A-1 that he had not received the truck or the title to the truck
from Mr. Ingersoll. R. at 88, pp. 23, 46. Although there was evidence that
Mr. Ingersoll did deliver a truck to Mr. Powell, the title to the truck showed
that Mr. Ingersoll retained a lien on the truck, and accordingly, the title was
returned by the Department of Motor Vehicles to Mr. Ingersoll. R. at 88, p.
96. Prior to trial, Mr. Ingersoll took possession of the truck, ostensibly,
because Mr. Powell owed Mr. Ingersoll on a debt. R. at 88, p. 124.
A-1 and Mr. Ingersoll talked in July and August about the bill owing
from Mr. Ingersoll and Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed some
money, but he claimed that he could not understand A-1 's statements and
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billing procedures and said he needed to reconcile the invoices. R. at 99, pp.
22-24.

In October 2002, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Ingersoll met to resolve the

accounting and to discuss payment for the waste disposal services. R. at 88,
p.24. At this meeting, they reached an agreement that the amount owed for
the services was $8,307.00 and according to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Ingersoll
agreed to pay that amount. R. at 88, p. 25.

At trial, Mr. Ingersoll disputed

that he made any such agreement and contended that A-1 still owed him the
credit due for the truck he was to deliver to Mr. Powell. R. at 88, p. 99.
In November 2002, Anderson, Ingersoll, Mark Powell and Daniel
Kingston, an officer of A-l Disposal, met at Kingston's office to discuss
payment of both Mr. Ingersoll's and Mr. Powell's past due accounts. At this
meeting, Mr. Ingersoll said that he was dealing for both himself and Mr.
Powell and that he wanted to resolve both accounts. R. at 88, pp. 27-28, 6871. Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed $8,307.00 for the services and
that the credit of $6,193.00 could be credited to what Mr. Powell owed A-l.
In December 2002, A-l applied the credit towards Mr. Powell's account,
leaving a balance due from Mr. Ingersoll of $8,307.00. R. at 88, p. 28.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A-l contends that the judgment of the trial Court should be affirmed,
because Mr. Ingersoll has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the
Court's Findings of Fact. In addition, A-l contends that the court properly
ruled that any agreement that Mr. Ingersoll was entitled to credit was not a
valid contract and was unenforceable, for the reasons that it was ambiguous,

did not contain the essential terms of any agreement between the parties and
there was no meeting of the minds of the parties. A-1 further contends that
the trial Court correctly ruled that A-1 was entitled to recover the value of
the services rendered, which the parties agreed was $8,307.00, under a
theory of unjust enrichment.
ARGUMENT
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF A-1 SHOULD BE
AFFIRMED.
A-1 contends that the trial Court properly ruled in favor of A-1 on its
Complaint and against Mr. Ingersoll on his Counterclaim and that the
judgment should be affirmed.
A. Mr. Ingersoll Has Failed To Marshal the Evidence
Supporting the Court's Findings of Fact.
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires "[a] party
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports
the challenged finding." See also, State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, 124 P.3d 235;
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94, 54 P.3d 1177. To
pass this threshold, the party protesting findings of fact must "marshal all
the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in
a light most favorable to the court below." Clark, 2005 UT 75. Where an
appellant fails to so marshal the evidence, the appellate court will assume
that all findings of fact are adequately supported by the record. Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P. 3d 1177; 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004
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UT 72, 99 P. 3d 801. The appellate court then need not consider the
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18,
20 P. 3d 332. Mr. Ingersoll has totally failed to marshal any of the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, but simply cites the evidence he
contends supports his theory.
There was ample evidence introduced at trial to support the court's
findings of fact that there was no valid contract. For example, Mr. Anderson
testified when asked whether or not he agreed that Mr. Ingersoll was entitled
to the $14,500.00 credit, that "the original agreement was over." R. at 88, p.
26. He also testified that "there wouldn't be any further services to use up
the credit." R. at 88, p. 38. He testified that Mr. Ingersoll never claimed to
be owed anything on the alleged credit. R. at 88, pp. 28, 49 and 132. Daniel
Kingston also testified that Mr. Ingersoll never claimed to be entitled to any
credit, R. at 88, p. 70.
Further, it is clear from the written document itself, that essential terms
for enforcement were missing. As the court found,
The May 15, 2002, written document is not an integrated contract and
indeed was not even a valid contract as it did not fully state several
essential terms to form a valid agreement." R. at 47.
The document did not mention Mr. Powell or what he was supposed to
do, did not describe the consideration that was to be given, did not state
when or where any performance was to be completed, or provide any
remedies for non-performance. It was also clear from the evidence presented
at trial, based upon the actions of the parties, that very shortly after the
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document was executed, none of the parties considered the document to
have any validity.
B. A-1 Did Not Make Judicial Admissions of the Existence of a
Contract That Entitled Mr. Ingersoll to $14,500.00 credit
It is true that A-1 sued Mr. Ingersoll and that the Complaint alleged that
Mr. Ingersoll owed A-1 $9,006.25 for goods and services rendered. R. at 1.
That was the value of the services A-1 contended was owed for the services
provided, pursuant to the agreement of the parties. It is clear from the
Complaint, that A-1 did not agree that Mr. Ingersoll was due any credit
under the May 15, 2002 document. In A-l's reply to Mr. Ingersoll's
Counterclaim, R. at 8-9, A-1 specifically denied paragraph 3 of Mr.
Ingersoll's Counterclaim that alleged,
On or about May 15, 2002, counterclaim defendant Ralph Anderson
(Anderson) entered into a contract with counterclaim plaintiff Mel
Ingersoll (Ingersoll). R. at 6.
A-1 also asserted the affirmative defenses to Mr. Ingersoll's counterclaim
based upon the alleged contract, of failure or lack of consideration, prior
breach by Mr. Ingersoll and the statute of frauds.

These judicial pleadings,

along with the testimony of A-l's witnesses cited above, certainly put Mr.
Ingersoll and his counsel on notice that A-1 disputed the validity of any
agreement to credit Mr. Ingersoll $14,500.00. Mr. Ingersoll argues that the
proposed Findings of Fact filed by A-1 was a judicial admission, binding
upon A-1. Mr. Ingersoll neglects to identify these Findings of Fact as
"proposed", submitted to the court prior to trial, before any evidence was
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offered and not accepted or adopted by the trial court. The proposed
findings also stated in paragraph 8 "That the May 15, 2002 agreement
became void" for non-performance. R. at 37. The evidence presented fully
supported the trial court's findings that there was no enforceable contract.
As Mr. Ingersoll failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
findings, it should be assumed that the findings are supported by the
evidence.
C. The Testimony and Conduct of A-1 Do Not Show the
Existence of a Contract
Contrary to what Mr. Ingersoll claims the evidence showed, (without
marshaling the evidence supporting the findings as required) the evidence was
clear that the parties, subsequent to May 15, 2002, did not rely upon or
consider the May 15, 2002 document to be binding. Mr. Powell delivered an
inoperable truck and two, rather than three, containers to Plaintiff.

Mr.

Ingersoll delivered a truck to Mr. Powell, however, he did not deliver the truck
free and clear of liens. The title to the truck, listing Mr. Powell as owner, listed
Mr. Ingersoll as a lien holder, showing that Mr. Ingersoll retained a security
interest in the truck. Being listed as lien holder, when the transfer of title to
Mr. Powell did take place, the new title would have been returned to Mr.,
Ingersoll, not Mr. Powell. That explains why Mr. Ingersoll, not Mr. Powell, had
the title at trial and why Mr. Powell was apparently confused about when if
ever, he received the title. R. at 88, p. 122. Clearly, no party followed through
on any part of the May 15, 2002 document.
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The actions of the parties

demonstrated that no party considered the written document to be binding on
any of them.

Mr. Ingersoll did not pay what and when the May 15, 2002

document said he would pay. Mr. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed Plaintiff
for service and never asked for the claimed credit until after this lawsuit was
filed. The service of Plaintiff to Defendant was terminated after three or four
months. Clearly, the evidence of an enforceable contract was not "undisputed"
as Defendant claims, but instead, preponderated in favor of the Court's ruling.
Mr. Ingersoll's reliance on the case of Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land &
Livestock Co., 456 F2d 996 (10 th Cir. 1972) is misplaced.
bench trial as ours was, but was tried to a jury.

That case was not a
The issue on appeal

concerned the instructions that were given to the jury and the failure of the
judge to give certain other instructions requested by the appellant. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in this case that the instructions given
"precluded the defendant from advancing any tenable defense" and "the
defendant was blocked out and frustrated in advancing a defense".

In our

case, there was no jury, no instructions and the judge carefully considered all
of the offered evidence.
D.

The Trial Court's Finding Did Not Violate Mr. Ingersoll's Due
Process of Law

Mr. Ingersoll alleges that the trial court's finding that there was no
contract between the parties deprived him of due process, because he did not
have adequate notice that the existence of a contract was at issue and he was
therefore deprived of the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way. This
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argument is not supported by the record. Mr. Ingersoll's whole case was
centered on proving the existence of a contract. His counterclaim pled for relief
based upon the supposed contract. A-1 's Complaint and Reply to
Counterclaim disputed the validity of any such contract. The document Mr.
Ingersoll claimed to be a binding contract was received as evidence in the case,
and Mr. Ingersoll called witnesses to support his theory that the document
constituted a binding contract between the parties. In closing argument, he
asked the trial court to award him judgment based upon the written document.
Mr. Ingersoll cites the case of Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah
1983), as support for his due process argument. That case is readily
distinguishable from our case. In Nelson, the defendant was pro se. He had
discharged his attorney and apparently had not received from his attorney the
file that contained the pleadings in the case. He appeared in court pursuant to
the plaintiffs motion to set aside a stipulated dismissal of the case and to set
the matter for trial. The defendant appeared at the hearing on the motion,
without counsel and the motion was granted. The court informed the
defendant that the matter would be set for a hearing (not a trial) two weeks
later. Two days before the case was scheduled for trial, the defendant received
the notice of trial from the court. Defendant appeared for trial without counsel
and judgment was awarded to plaintiff on a cause of action for alienation of
affections, in the total sum of $84,600.00, which included $25,000.00 punitive
damages. The Utah Supreme Court reversed, holding that giving the
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defendant two days notice of the trial and not informing him of his rights as a
pro se litigant, deprived him of due process. The court said at page 1214,
The deficiency in this case concerns what happened before the trial. The
vulnerability of a layman who is unrepresented as he approaches a trial of
the legal and factual complexity of this case requires more judicial
consideration than was extended here. Most importantly, defendant was
not clearly informed of the date of trial until two days before it was to
begin. That deficiency jeopardized one of the most important ingredients
of due process: time to prepare a defense.
In our case, the Complaint, Counterclaim, and the Reply to Counterclaim
clearly presented the issues of whether or not there was a contract that entitled
Mr. Ingersoll to any credit, whether that contract was void, and whether or not,
if there were a contract, it was breached. A-l's Reply to Mr. Ingersoll's
Counterclaim denied the existence of the contract. A-l's counsel, in his
opening statement, speaking of the May 15, 2002 agreement, said, "So that
agreement, at least in the eyes of the plaintiff, was void. It wasn't followed
through; it was breached". R. at 88, p.

The evidence and the testimony of the

witnesses called by both parties, all spoke to those issues. Mr. Ingersoll was
represented throughout the proceedings by competent counsel, who had
conducted discovery, including deposing Mr. Anderson. There were no
surprises and Mr. Ingersoll's due process rights were fully protected.
E. Rule 54, U.R.C.P. Provides That a Judgment Shall Grant the
Relief to Which the Party In Whose Favor It Is Rendered Is
Entitled.
Even if Mr. Ingersoll were correct, that the judgment of the trial court does
not conform to the pleadings or to the relief requested by A-1, which clearly is
not the case, Rule 54, U.R.C.P. provides,
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(c) 1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered
by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in
whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings.
Based upon all of the evidence presented at trial, the trial court properly
concluded that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment in its favor, for the amount
awarded and so ruled.
CONCLUSION
The trial court heard the testimony of the witnesses, assessed their
credibility, viewed the documentary evidence, and after taking the matter
under advisement and weighing all of the evidence presented, found in favor of
the plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, A-l respectfully asks this court to
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Dated this j ^ / d a y of August, 2006.

T
T/it^rrofrkn
S^~
Carl•1 IE.
Kingston
Attorney for A-1 Disposal
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